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USO imprinting and market entry timing: Exploring the influence of university 
ecosystems 
Abstract 
University spin-offs (USOs) have attracted increasing attention due to being an important 
source of innovation, university income and job creation. To support their creation and growth, 
universities have developed university ecosystems of diverse actors. However, existing 
research has found mixed results on the effectiveness of these support mechanisms. In 
particular, there is a lack of research illustrating the impact pre-market support mechanisms 
can have on pre-market USO development and their strategic outcomes such as timing of the 
USOs’ first market entry. The findings identify that both the university environment and 
ecosystem actors leave lasting positive and negative imprints upon USO founders’. USO 
founders who had positive engagement with university ecosystem actors and perceived their 
university environment as supportive, developed entrepreneurial skills and market knowledge 
earlier in the USO formation process. This resulted in greater market readiness and, 
consequently, contributed to an early first market entry. Conversely, USO founders who 
perceived barriers within their university environment and had negative experiences with 
ecosystem stakeholders developed more cautious and risk-averse behaviour, contributing to a 
late market entry. This research contributed new knowledge into the antecedents of USO 
market entry timing through the novel lens of imprinting.  
  
Managerial Relevance Statement 
This research has value for USO founders, university technology transfer office and incubator 
managers. We identify the enduring impact that imprints from university ecosystems can have 
on USO development and market entry timing. Consequently, this research will help inform 
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practical interventions to increase the chances of positive USO imprinting. For example, 
university managers can use these empirical insights to gain an understanding of how 
individual academics within the same institution may perceive the support universities offer in 
different ways, based on their prior experiences. Therefore, both university and TTO managers 
may wish to gather feedback from academics to understand if the environment is enabling or 
hindering USO development. Furthermore, through these findings, university, TTO and 
incubator managers can appreciate the importance of dedicating resources to ensuring that USO 
founders have positive engagements and experiences with external stakeholders from as early 
as the research phase. This may involve having surrogate entrepreneurs in residence who 
encourage and help embed entrepreneurial proclivity within the cognitive frames of academics 
from an early stage. This research also has relevance for USO founders, by illustrating how the 
unconscious imprinting effect of previous experiences can enhance or impede their USO’s 
development and, consequently, market entry timing. 
Keywords: Imprinting, USO, market entry timing, ecosystems, technology transfer, university 
support mechanisms 
  
I Introduction 
The role of business incubators and technology transfer offices (TTOs) in supporting the 
development of university spin-offs (USOs) is widely recognised [1] [2] [3]. However, in 
recent years, there has been increasing acknowledgement of the importance of developing a 
wider university ecosystem to help support USO development [4] [5]. A university ecosystem 
can be defined as a “set of university-affiliated organizational entities that are connected by 
directly supporting TT activities” [4, p. 5]. Entities comprise of not only TTOs, incubators and 
science parks, but can refer to specific actors such as industry, government, surrogate 
entrepreneurs and the university environment [5] [4]. Prior research has found mixed results 
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on the role of university ecosystem entities during firm formation [6] [4] [7], resulting in the 
need for further exploration. Furthermore, little is known about how university ecosystem 
engagement can influence critically important strategic outcomes, such as the timing of USO 
first market entry after foundation. Entry timing is a critical strategic decision for any 
organisation whose ‘windows of opportunity’ [8, p. 191] are time-limited before competitors 
emerge [9]. This is particularly important in competitive and dynamic high-technology 
industries, like those of USOs, where opportunities should be pursued sooner rather than later 
to enhance firm performance and sustainability [10]. However, the factors that influence the 
organisational emergence process and subsequent market entry timing, have seldom been 
investigated [11]. 
Market entry timing is more than a strategic decision and is contingent on firms having 
sufficient resources and capabilities in place to successfully enter the market [12] [13]. It is 
known that USO teams often lack entrepreneurial skills, market knowledge and resources [4] 
[10] [14], therefore they rely heavily on entities within their university ecosystem to 
successfully progress from the research phase to market entry [15] [13]. Prior studies on USOs 
have often focused on the motivations, challenges, and outcomes of USO development [16] 
[17]; yet, with few exceptions, studies have paid insufficient attention to the milestones of 
venture emergence from idea to market-entry, and in particular, to the determinants of its timing 
[18] [11]. Further, even among the rare exceptions examining the time dimension in USOs and 
highlighting a positive correlation with external support engagement (e.g. [18] [8]), Markmann 
et al. [18, p. 1073] identify the need for research that “further explicate[s] the roles that various 
participants play in the technology commercialisation ecosystem”. In particular, they stress the 
need for further theoretical exploration of how different actors can help to reduce 
commercialisation time. We attempt to enhance this line of investigation and address the gaps 
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in previous research by employing the strategy of ‘theory borrowing’ [19]from the fields of 
psychology and entrepreneurship by adopting imprinting theory.  
Imprinting theory contends that prior experiences and critical events can influence 
individual and organisational outcomes [20]. Studies have found that the past experiences of 
founders, decisions made early on in venture formation [21], and environmental conditions 
[22], can all significantly influence a new venture’s development path [21] [23] [24]. We 
suggest that this process is even more prominent in the context of USOs, where academic 
entrepreneurs possess complex technological knowledge often at the expense of 
entrepreneurial and/or industry knowledge [10] [25] [26]. Consequently, we suggest that the 
university environment and external support mechanisms play a potentially important 
imprinting role influencing founders’ pre-entry behaviour and decision-making processes [27] 
[21] [4] and critically, USO market entry timing. Thus, the aim of this study is to answer the 
following research question: RQ: How do pre-market support mechanisms imprint upon USO 
development and influence the timing of their first market entry? 
To explore this, we take a processual perspective of USO formation to investigate the 
micro level imprinting effect of university ecosystem entities, during various stages of  Italian 
USO formation. The findings reveal that both the university environment and specific 
university ecosystem actors such as the TTO, incubator, industry and surrogate entrepreneurs 
leave lasting imprints upon USOs’ development at different stages influencing pre-market 
entry. This imprinting was both positive and negative. Positive engagement with university 
ecosystem actors and a supportive environment helped USO founders develop entrepreneurial 
skills and market knowledge, resulting in greater market readiness at foundation and early first 
market entry. Conversely, USO founders who perceived barriers within their university 
environment and had negative experiences with university ecosystem stakeholders, resulted in 
more cautious and risk-averse behaviour, identified as delaying their market entry. 
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This paper makes three key contributions. First, we provide novel insights into the use 
of imprinting theory to understand the micro-level antecedents of USOs’ first market entry 
timing. Second, we extend knowledge on the enduring impact of the university environment 
and the role individual actors play (such as the TTO, incubator, surrogate entrepreneurs and 
industry) during USO formation. In particular, we stress the time implications of their 
engagement, which are critical in the context of high-technology industries featuring 
increasingly short windows of opportunity. Third, this research illustrates the importance of 
considering the imprinting effect of the holistic university ecosystem within which USOs are 
developed, from as early as the research phase, as a key determinant of market entry timing. 
  
II THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
USOs are new companies formed by university faculty members, staff members, or students to 
commercialise academic research outputs [1] and are increasingly recognised as a valuable 
source of university revenue [25]. USOs share a number of similarities with High Technology-
Based Ventures, such as operating in conditions of high market uncertainty and dynamism [28] 
[29]. However, USOs also have unique contextual characteristics that make them more liable 
to failure [29] [16]. For example, USO founders can be subjected to conflicting interests, such 
as the “publish or perish” nature of academic culture and the profit-maximising strive of 
entrepreneurship [2] [25]. This can limit the time and effort devoted to USO development, 
hindering timely progression [30] [31]. Additional obstacles associated with the academic 
origin of USOs pertain to founders’ limited industry and entrepreneurial experience [26], 
limited networks [4] and poor business skills [16] [10]. These factors have been found to be 
reliable predictors of future firm activity and outcomes [25] [16], and have been identified to 
cause substantial time-lags between USO research generation and its industry application [8]. 
Lazear [32] argues that successful entrepreneurs need to possess a variety of skills; however, 
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academic entrepreneurs often have unbalanced skill sets, i.e. high-level technical skills but 
weaker business skills, resulting in longer time-lags to market [8] and higher chances of failure. 
Therefore, universities have introduced different mechanisms of support. 
In many universities, the establishment of a TTO and/or incubator signals the 
institution’s commitment to science commercialisation activities [4] [25]. TTOs represent 
intermediary entities between university researchers and external entities, such as companies 
and investors [33] [26]. The particular aim of TTOs is to protect and manage the IP generated 
within universities, to establish industry partnerships, and to provide initial commercialisation 
advice to academics [34] [35]. Whereas incubators represent facilities that provide academic 
founders with office space, equipment, mentoring assistance, networking support and, at times, 
even capital during USO foundation [30] [6]. Incubators aim to support early-stage ventures to 
the point where they become viable entities [35]. Substantial research has been devoted to 
examining TTOs and incubators in supporting USO formation, however studies report mixed 
findings [6] [25]. For example, prior research identifies that incubators and TTOs generate 
positive USO performance effects by helping academics develop entrepreneurial capabilities, 
access external resources [17], and assess the commercial viability of the opportunity [13]. 
Others have raised questions around the effectiveness of incubators [6] and TTOs (e.g. [26] 
[7]). Litan et al. [36] identify the lengthy bureaucracy of TTOs as a “bottleneck”, rather than 
facilitator, of innovation. Furthermore, Clayton et al. [37], argues that the sheer breadth of 
support offered by incubators renders it difficult to assess their performance effects without 
considering the type of support provided. Consequently more research is needed to provide 
fine-grained knowledge on the effectiveness of different support mechanisms. 
University ecosystems also comprise of government agencies who often provide proof 
of concept funding for early stage USOs and market parties such as surrogate entrepreneurs, 
industrial partners and investors [4]. These entities have been found to help USO founders 
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overcome their skill gaps [38] by being included in the founding team of the venture. Huynh 
et al. [14] contend that by including academics and non-academics in founding teams, USOs 
are able to effectively integrate technical and business knowledge, resulting in positive 
performance outcomes [38] such as early market entry [8]. However, limited research has 
examined how surrogate entrepreneurs and industrial partners influence the behaviour and 
decisions of academic founders during formation. 
 Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that beyond formal support systems, such as 
incubators, TTOs, government agencies, market agencies, university links with industry and 
investors [4], USOs benefit from informal support mechanisms, which constitute an additional 
important component of the university ecosystems within which academic entrepreneurs 
operate [4]. Informal support systems include the encouragement provided by academic 
colleagues, the university department and the academic environment as a whole, and have been 
found to influence technology commercialisation behaviour [39]. Muller [8] found that 
informal support mechanisms encourage founders in the timely identification and pursuit of 
the entrepreneurial opportunity, whereas formal support mechanisms significantly reduce 
formation costs. Ultimately, prior research agrees that a combination of formal and informal 
support mechanisms can assist USO formation, potentially reducing USO development time 
[8] through faster opportunity recognition, complementary capability development and 
facilitating market access [3] [25]. However, Wright et al. [40] and Rothaermel and Thursby 
[41], caution that, while support mechanisms increase the probability of USO survival, they 
are time-consuming and may increase, rather than decrease the time-lags between research 
generation and industry application. Consequently, the interrelationship between 
entrepreneurial support and the time dimension in USOs remains ambiguous, warranting 
further empirical exploration. 
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Research has argued that early market entrants have a higher chance of success in highly 
uncertain and dynamic environments, like high-technology industries [10]. Furthermore, early 
entrants display greater readiness to commit resources in conditions of uncertainty and rapid 
change, while late entrants tend to be more cautious and gradually learn from emerging 
information [42]. Yet, little is known about how the processes and interactions within 
university ecosystems can shape USO behaviour and trajectories at different stages of 
development and how this may influence first market entry [18]. While limited insights can be 
gained from existing literature on USO market entry timing (E.g. [8] [18]) it is widely 
acknowledged within the entrepreneurship field that founding conditions play a significant role 
in the future development of new ventures [23] [20] [43]. Borrowing from entrepreneurship 
and psychology, we employ imprinting theory to cast new light on the influence of ecosystem 
actors and environments on USOs’ first market entry timing. 
  
B. Pre-market Entry Imprinting 
The concept of imprinting can be traced back to Stinchcombe [20], who suggested that the 
environmental conditions and events during firm formation determined the firm’s 
organisational form and future trajectory. Since then, a vast amount of literature has explored 
the imprinting effects prior experiences can have on venture development [22]. The process of 
imprinting is said to involve two key roles: the imprinted, and the imprinter [44]. The term 
‘imprinted’ refers to the “focal entity or actor that is subject to imprinting” [35, p. 293], and is 
normally the unit of analysis within research studies. Conversely, an ‘imprinter’ or ‘source of 
imprint’ [21] is the unit which enacts its influence over the imprinted, and it can take the form 
of the wider environment (e.g. the university environment), individuals and/or groups (such as 
the industry, surrogate entrepreneurs), and organisations (i.e. TTO, incubators). 
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The imprinting process has associated with both positive and negative effects [21] [24], 
where an experience can lead to changing behaviours, mindset and strategic actions at both a 
conscious and subconscious level, influencing organisational forms [24]. Furthermore, 
imprinting has been found to have an enduring effect on the organisation [45] due to path-
dependency based on vested interests and structural inertia, making it difficult for organisations 
to subsequently adapt and change [22] [44] [20]. For example, Pieper et al.’s [46] study on 
family firms found that founders’ rules and values were imprinted upon the organisation and 
passed on throughout subsequent generations, leading to the persistence of a multi-family 
organisational form. Lippmann et al. [47] suggested that imprinting persists over time due to 
collective memories. Similarly, Bryant [24] highlighted the importance of managing, and even 
designing, imprinting systems that facilitate the formation of collective memories, viewed as 
advantageous to entrepereneurial ventures. How these processes take place, however, is poorly 
understood. To contribute to our understanding of the imprinting process, it is important to 
identify its key elements. 
Marquis and Tilcsik [22] synthesised research on imprinting theory across different 
disciplines, and identified that it consists of three essential elements. The first element is 
sensitive periods, which refers to different stages during new venture formation, or times of 
turbulent change where a firm is more susceptible to environmental influence. The second 
element is stamp of the environment, where the firm internalises and encapsulates elements of 
its environment. Carroll and Hannan [48] draw upon Stitchcombe’s [20] original work to argue 
that organisations will structure themselves to fit the environment they are exposed to during 
formation. The third element is persistence, reflecting that prior experiences embed themselves 
in organisational forms and are difficult to change due to path dependencies, organisational 
inertia and institutionalisation [22] [21].  
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Increasing attention is being devoted to the importance of imprinting in 
entrepreneurship, with scholars finding that imprints from market actors increase the 
entrepreneurial proclivity of founders [45] and determine new venture structure, culture and 
routines [24]. Others suggest that imprinting can determine an organisation’s fate, growth and 
survival [44] [45]. Furthermore, imprinting theory enables the consideration of how different 
contextual factors influence entrepreneurial behaviours and firm formation. For example, 
Micelotta et al. [49] explored how gender can imprint upon entrepreneurial behaviour. Dufays 
et al. [50] find that diversity in team composition imprints upon organisations and can lead to 
hybrid organisational forms. Others have explored how founders’ perceived social identity 
shapes their new venture [51]. However, few studies examine imprinting in the academic 
entrepreneurship context, except for recent studies by Ciuchta [52] and Hahn et al. [53] who 
show the applicability and usefulness of imprinting to understand academic and spin-off 
behaviour. Indeed, Ciuchta’s [52] study of multigenerational spin-offs originating from USOs, 
identifies that founder experiences during first generation USO formation imprint upon future 
spin-offs from the focal firm. Conversely, Hahn et al. [53] find that academic scientists’ career 
imprint, developed through ingrained behaviours of collaborative research, can positively 
influence their engagement in open innovation within startups. However, this change in 
academics behvaiour can only takes place if the academics depart from their scientific logic, 
that is to advance knowledge in a non-commercial manner, and embrace business practices 
such as strategic planning. How imprinting can support academics to maximise the benefits of 
their career imprint and minimise its drawbacks, as well as to increase the timeliness of their 
first market entry is poorly understood. 
Existing imprinting research has highlighted the key role of the social and 
environmental factors in shaping entrepreneurial decisions [25]. In a USO context, this could 
include the academic environment and the university’s approach towards science 
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commercialisation, which can influence the norms and behaviours of academic founders, and 
the support they receive during commercialisation activities [4] [54]. Studies have found that 
the university context can direct the design of entrepreneurial ventures and influence the long-
term motivation and entrepreneurial intent of academics, thus influencing their ability to 
recognise and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities [55]. Interestingly, Tilcsik [56] identifies 
that perceptions of an environment, as opposed to the environment per se, acts as the main 
source of imprinting. Building on these insights, from a conceptual perspective we suggest that 
the environmental conditions and ecosystem support that USOs are exposed to during pre-
foundation and pre-market entry influence future USO development and, critically, the timing 
of first market entry.  In particular, we suggest that the imprinting process leads to the 
absorption of new knowledge, experiences and behaviours that affect the cognitive schema and 
mental models of academic founders, determining their strategic actions and, ultimately USOs’ 
trajectory and timing of first market entry. 
  
III METHODOLOGY 
3. Research Design 
To capture the complexity of imprinting and how it influences USO outcomes, a qualitative, 
interpretivist approach was adopted. Qualitative research is appropriate for contexts where 
there is a goal to interpret meaning from actions and experiences [57]. Italy was selected as the 
context for this study for several reasons. First, similarly to other European countries such as 
the UK, France and Spain, Italy has devoted increasing efforts to promoting and supporting the 
research commercialisation efforts of its universities1. For example, most Italian universities 
have developed university ecosystems and introduced incentives for scientists to participate in 
                                               
1 According to the NETVAL (2018) report on Technology Transfer activities in Italy, Italian universities have increased their 
investment in university Intellectual Property protection by 128.52% compared to 2004. Furthermore, technology licensing 
agreements between external market parties and universities have increased by 292% since 2004, and 80% of USOs 
presently active in Italy were created over the last decade. 
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science commercialisation activities [58]. Second, exploring the Italian context responds to 
calls for studies to explore USOs in Continental European countries, where the entrepreneurial 
and innovation ecosystems are notably less developed than in the UK and the US [59] [40]. 
A case study approach was adopted to generate rich insights into USO development 
[60]. We followed a theory-based sampling strategy to find manifestations of the theoretical 
phenomenon of interest, to examine its nature and extend existing knowledge [61]. A 
purposeful sampling method was used to identify cases which meet the required conditions i.e. 
USOs that have successfully commercialised and entered the market. A semi-structured 
interview approach was employed, targeting multiple USOs originating from two Italian 
universities which are research-intensive and world-leading in STEM subjects. Both 
universities rank in the top 50 globally [62]2 and are among the most proficient institutions 
nationally in the creation of USOs [63]. This strategy ensured that the USOs faced similar 
macro-environmental conditions within a clearly defined institutional and geographic context 
to allow for comparison and subsequent theory development. 
Data Collection 
To ensure validity and reliability, both primary and secondary data were collected to 
triangulate data sources, map critical imprinting points and allow for thick description that 
generates in-depth insights into a real-world phenomenon [64]. First, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a senior management representative of the TTO and the 
university incubator in each respective university, to gain an overarching understanding of 
USO development in Italy. Second, a compilation of target USO respondents for each 
institution was developed using the “Spin-off Italia” database and official university and 
company websites. 103 USO respondents were identified and contacted to determine their 
suitability for the study. Suitability criteria included the respondent’s involvement in USO 
                                               
2 QS World University Rankings was used as a reference as, first, it places most of its weight on academic reputation and, 
second, it represents the most widely read source for university rankings (Alexa Data, 2019). 
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formation from its earliest stages and the USO having successfully entered the market after 
foundation. 22 semi-structured interviews were performed with USOs respondents. Given the 
renowned ambiguity surrounding ‘appropriate sample size’ in qualitative research [65], and 
given the challenge of estimating data saturation, we followed Marshall et al.’s 
[66]recommendation to set a numerical guideline based on sample sizes of previous 
comparable studies. Given this study’s focus on USO pre-foundation behaviour, we referred to 
Vohora et al.’s [13] study on USO formation, which examined 9 UK-based USOs. Our research 
aimed to explore both early and late entrant USOs; therefore, we aimed to interview 9 USOs 
from each category. Contact and persuasion efforts were ceased once the minimum number 
was reached. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the USO founders. Furthermore, 
TTO and incubator manager, agency representatives and investors who operate across the two 
universities were also interviewed to capture the university ecosystem’s perspective on USO 
formation and development, and to enhanced reliability [65]. Details of interview respondents 
are provided in Table 1 and 2.  
***insert table 1 and 2 here*** 
A critical incident interview technique [67] was used to identify key ‘imprinting points’ and 
corresponding actions. The interview questions covered topics such as the ecosystem support  
available to and accessed by academics during their commercialisation activities, pre- and post-
USO foundation; the types of actors USOs collaborate with during USO development; the 
challenges and antecedents of USO development; narratives of critical experiences, events 
and/or interactions during USO evolution, from the research phase to the moment of market 
entry, the timing of market entry and the evolution of the USO from research phase to market 
entry. Interviews lasted between 40–90 minutes. Detailed field notes were taken during and 
after the interview process [68]. Interview recordings were transcribed and translated verbatim. 
This process resulted in 363 pages of interview data. 
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Data Analysis 
Data analysis involved an iterative process where emergent themes from the empirical 
data were interpreted in the light of existing literature and informed the direction of subsequent 
collection through the identification of new questions [68]. First, a process of open coding or 
“first-cycle coding” [69] was performed. Second, a process of pattern searching was followed 
which resulted in the identification of second order themes emerging from the open codes [69]. 
These second-order themes were aligned with the theoretical perspective of imprinting [20], 
through the identification of pivotal interactions and experiences, three key ‘sensitive periods’ 
were identified [21] [22] which constituted the overarching themes, or dimensions [70]. These 
were the research phase, the idea conception phase, and the pre-entry phase. Finally, a process 
of within and cross-case analysis [69] was conducted to identify similarities and differences 
across USO categories. This involved categorising USOs into two groups based on their market 
entry timing. There is a lack of empirical studies examining the timing of first market entry 
[11] [9], therefore literature does not have an agreed timeframe for early or late market entry. 
This is due to market entry earliness being subjective, depending on the type of sector and 
competitiveness of the market. However, high technology sectors are acknowledged to have 
short life cycles, particularly in highly competitive markets [71]. Therefore, early entrants were 
those who had entered the market within 6 months, which reflected the university TTOs’ 
metrics to capture earliness to market. Imprinting experiences in each sensitive period were 
then compared across USOs of the same category and, subsequently, across USO categories. 
Table 3 illustrates the structuring and ordering of the data, including informant-derived first-
order categories, second-order themes and aggregate dimensions. 
IV FINDINGS 
         Analysis of the data revealed that all case USOs went through three “sensitive periods” 
during formation, where critical incidents at each stage led to positive or negative imprinting 
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which influenced the USOs’ trajectory and subsequent market entry strategies. These sensitive 
periods included the Research Phase, the Idea Conception Phase, and Pre-Entry Phase. Figure 
1 illustrates the findings to highlight the differences between early and late entrants’ imprinting 
experiences, emphasising key sources of imprinting during each phase and whether the 
imprinting experience was holistically regarded as positive or negative. These findings will 
now be discussed.  
 
Figure 1 – Pre-Foundation Imprinting in Early and Late Entrant USOs 
A.      Research phase 
The research phase reflects the period of time in which founders were actively engaged in 
academic research activities, but had not yet pursued commercialisation activities. This phase 
was identified as being very influential in directing future entrepreneurial actions, highlighting 
that imprinting often takes place at the subconscious level. The majority of founders reported 
that they were not initially interested in pursuing an entrepreneurial path; however, the wider 
academic environment, which had limited job opportunities for young academics, was 
identified as being a subconscious source of imprinting which influenced the pursuit of USO 
formation for both early and late market entrants. Indeed, both sets of founders were motivated 
by the same activation trigger. 
There were no jobs in academia in Italy. Essentially that was the main driver behind the 
creation of the firm. I mean, had we been in an environment where Italian universities [...] 
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offered more opportunities for young researchers, perhaps we wouldn’t have thought about 
creating a spin-off. (USO Founder, Case LAT3). 
A second source of imprinting during the research phase was the parent university’s 
commitment to and support of technology transfer (TT).  As shown in table 3, both universities 
had early and late market entrants. Despite USO founders in both universities being exposed 
to the same university-wide processes and support mechanisms for TT, the findings revealed 
that early and late entrant founders had different perceptions and experiences, resulting in 
different imprinting effects. For example, late entrants perceived their academic environment 
as unsupportive of TT and as prioritising pure research. The pressure for scientific 
advancement, publication and securing research funding was particularly strong at the 
departmental-level. The founder of Case LAT6, a biotech USO developing diagnostic 
respiratory devices, stated that their categorisation and departmental expectation to be “pure 
academic researchers” was a key determinant of their slow and gradual progression through 
formation. This categorisation influenced the amount of time they spent on developing their 
USO, as they did not deem it to be a legitmate activity. Therefore, their perception of the 
academic environment negatively shaped their entrepreneurial behaviour, leading to cautious 
and risk-averse behaviour throughout USO formation. In contrast, early entrants reported a 
supportive university and departmental environment. They acknowledged that, at the beginning 
of USO formation, it was challenging to balance research, teaching and exploratory TT; 
however, their experience of their institutional and departmental support for TT were 
highlighted as being positive. 
It was evident from the interviews that USO founders’ early technology transfer 
experiences had a long-lasting impact on their entrepreneurial behaviour. A negative 
experience with a university ecosystem entity at the research phase significantly influenced 
subsequent USO development. For example, several late entrants reported that, during TT 
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activities in the early research phase, external partners’ concerns regarding either the 
attractiveness of the technology (e.g. LAT4) or its premature state (e.g. LAT7) led progress to 
stall.  For example, Case LAT4, a USO marketing 3D facial-recognition technology, engaged 
with an external company that told the founders that “this kind of commercial activity is 
basically over, there was no market for it”. These negative experiences led to cautious 
behaviour until enough market evidence was collected to identify a viable opportunity. 
Consequently, perceiving high risks in relation to technology transfer resulted in the 
prioritisation of other academic activities, and in founders limiting their engagement with the 
TTO. 
All early entrants, conversely, highlighted an on-going engagement with the TTO and 
external market parties during the research phase. This engagement stemmed from their 
positive perception of their universities’ support mechanisms, resulting in more openness to 
imprinting. In particular, early entrant founders reported that close engagement with the TTO 
positively imprinted upon them, making them realise the importance of market knowledge to 
complement academic expertise. This resulted in more market-driven research activities that 
targeted existing market gaps, and encouraged engagement with external organisations. The 
TTO also encouraged the founders to develop entrepreneurial and business management skills 
alongside their research activities, which proved useful in subsequent stages of USO 
development.  
A key difference between early and late entrants was that the majority of early entrant 
founders were constantly engaging with external ecosystem stakeholders from the outset. 
These interactions subsconsciously imprinted upon early entrants. For example, Case EAR1, a 
USO marketing optical fibre sensor technology, identified that working with large companies 
for over 15 years helped them understand their potential markets and how their research could 
have market value. All early entrants reported that engagement with market experts, potential 
Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions in Engineering Management 
18 
 
clients and customers during the research phase led to the accumulation of market knowledge. 
This market knowledge aided the refinement of ideas, led to market validation and 
consequently improved their confidence in the attractiveness of the business opportunity. Case 
EAR1 illustrates this: “We had received a request from a huge multinational company to 
develop sensors for their industrial plants[…]. We developed it as university researchers[…]. 
We just adapted it a little. […] So these are companies that basically showed us that there was 
an interest in this kind of thing in the market, beyond just research. 
 It is important to note that early entrants’ experiences with these external actors were 
identified as positive, in contrast to late market entrants who identified their interactions with 
external entities as negative, rendering them less open to imprinting. The next sections will 
illustrate how this posture consequently affected imprinting in later phases. Early entrants’ 
positive interactions and engagement with external entities cumulatively contributed to shifting 
their focus from the academic notion of knowledge generation, to the market notion of 
knowledge exploitation from as early as the research phase. This made them more subsceptible 
to imprinting in later phases.  
 
B.     Business Idea Conception 
The stage at which founders identified their entrepreneurial opportunity and consciously 
decided to create a USO was considered a sensitive period [21]. During this stage, early 
entrants’ positive engagement with a variety of ecosystem players was found to support their 
transition from the research phase to business idea conception. In particular, early entrant USOs 
reported that the TTO, the university environment and, to a lesser extent, the incubator were 
key sources of imprinting. 
For example, to initiate the USO formation process, the TTO required all founders to 
develop a business plan detailing the business opportunity and its planned pursuit. Early 
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entrants reported their intitial apprehension regarding the development of a business plan, due 
to their expert knowledge already indicating a market need for this technology. It was only 
after engaging with the process that early entrant founders recognised its benefits. Among the 
benefits achieved through this process were the ability to evaluate market gaps, greater clarity 
of direction, better framing of the opportunity and a targeted action plan with clearer paths to 
market. Therefore, the TTO was a positive imprinter through its TT processes. The TTO was 
also identified by early entrants as driving their growth ambitions by setting ambitious 
performance targets. 
A perceived supportive university environment was found to continue to enhance the 
confidence of early entrant founders. In particular, department-level acceptance of TT activities 
led early entrant founders to deem TT to be a legitimate part of their professional 
responsibilities. Combined with the imprinting effect of the TTO, this encouraged founders to 
spend time engaging with and involving surrogate entrepreneurs and industrial partners 
extensively in USO formation. Surrogate entrepreneurs and industrial partners, in turn, 
emerged as critical imprinters during the later pre-entry phase of early entrant USOs. Late 
entrant USOs, in contrast, engaged with university ecosystem entities to a lesser extent during 
the business idea conception phase; ecosystem entities were viewed in a negative light due to 
founders’ negative experiences of engagement during the research phase. Most late entrant 
founders perceived their departmental environment to be largely disinterested and neutral 
towards USO formation. Case LAT9, for example, highlighted that the university department 
had a “confused relationship with spin-offs [as] on the one hand it views them in a positive 
light, on the other hand it’s suspicious of them, because it fears that spin-offs might [steal] 
research contracts or resources from it”. 
 During idea conception, late entrant USOs reported that they primarily engaged with 
the TTO to fulfil the bureaucratic requirements involved in the formation process. Instead of 
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being motivated by the ambitious targets set by the TTO, as was the case for early entrants, late 
entrants viewed them in a negative light, feeling under pressure to overestimate their growth 
ambitions and forecasted sales figures. This generated a sense of uncertainty and fear of not 
meeting performance expectations, which added caution to their behaviour throughout 
formation. The differences in perceptions of TTO support among early and late entrants, 
despite the same mechanisms being place, is interesting to note. Late entrant USOs had very 
limited engagement with and consequential imprinting from other ecosystem parties such as 
the incubator, surrogate entrepreneurs, industrial partners and investors. Critically, in the rare 
instances where interactions occurred, they often resulted in founders feeling discouraged 
and/or less committed to the venture. 
We approached an investment fund at that time, and their comments were to the effect of “Well, 
the idea doesn’t sound good… it’s not flashy enough”. […] And that was a first important 
knock-back… We didn’t agree [with their opinion], but we hadn’t really thought about the 
marketing side of things. (USO Founder, Case LAT11). 
In sum, during the business idea conception phase, early entrant USOs engaged with a 
wide variety of ecosystem players and these interactions generated long-lasting commitment, 
encouragement and confidence among USO founders. Conversely, late entrant USOs reported 
much more limited and sporadic engagement with ecosystem players. Their perceptions of the 
university environment and negative engagement with external entities in the research phase 
appeared to have had a lasting influence over both their openness to engage with entities and 
their commitment to the entrepreneurial opportunity, leading to more cautious behaviour. This 
limited their skill development compared to early entrants and, ultimately, slowed down their 
progression through formation and influenced their market entry timing. 
C.    Pre-Entry 
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Pre-entry is a sensitive period that began during pre-foundation, after the opportunity 
had been identified and framed, and ended when the firm entered the market for the first time, 
post-foundation. In both early and late entrant USOs, this sensitive period was the longest and 
most influential in terms of the timing of market entry. Four university ecosystem players 
emerged as being influential imprinters in the context of early entrant USOs: the incubator; 
surrogate entrepreneurs; industrial partners; and the parent university. The incubator was 
perceived as a positive source of knowledge and helped with skill development. Indeed, thanks 
to the incubator’s support,  early entrant founders recognised their value proposition and 
developed the entrepreneurial skills needed to rapidly introduce it into the market. 
The incubator was really very important for us, particularly in terms of giving us business skills 
and support, helping us perform market analyses, approaching clients, understanding the 
market… (USO Founder, Case EAR11). 
The majority of early entrants identified positive imprinting from the involvement of 
surrogate entrepreneurs and/or industrial partners during USO formation. It was identified that 
surrogate entrepreneurs acted as mentors, where they helped alleviate concerns and perceived 
uncertainty about the entrepreneurial process by sharing their knowledge and past experiences, 
both positive and negative. By sharing entrepreneurial and industry experience, surrogate 
entrepreneurs enabled founders to become more conscious of the target market, of their value 
proposition and, critically, of how to effectively sell it to potential clients. As a result, founders 
manifested greater confidence when approaching potential clients. This pattern was particularly 
influential when surrogate entrepreneurs and industrial partners possessed both business skills 
and a technical understanding of the USO’s offering, and were able to integrate the two.  
[By having] an engineering background, combined with his professional experience, 
[the surrogate entrepreneur] was completely aware of what our offering was capable of 
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achieving. Therefore, he was able to sell it to market parties that did not come from a technical 
background. We followed his lead, basically. (USO Founder, Case EAR6).  
The findings, however, revealed that positive imprinting could only be realised when 
all parties’ were open and responsive to the relationship. The mere presence of a surrogate 
entrepreneur and/or an industrial partner was not sufficient; both parties had to be committed 
to the relationship by actively collaborating and combining their skillsets. This was particularly 
evident in cases EAR4 and EAR5, where the industrial partner recognised the shortcomings in 
academic entrepreneurs’ business skills and embraced the role of teaching academics how to 
frame their business “with an industry ethic, [where] the key objective is to generate turnover 
[…] and to sell a solution to the client’s problems” (USO Founder, Case EAR5). Where 
founders were open to learning from the industrial partner and devoted efforts to doing so (as 
was the case with early entrants), this resulted in positive imprints on the USOs. Furthermore, 
industrial partners often acted as USOs’ first clients after foundation. This provided founders 
with reassurance regarding the firm’s early survival and greater legitimacy when approaching 
other potential clients. For example, Case EAR8 stated that, among the reasons behind the 
involvement of an industrial partner during formation “was that [they] would commission work 
from us, meaning particular developments, product parts, and so on. This allowed us to begin 
the activity very quickly, and importantly, it gave us a track-record of clients”. This was 
particularly important as most academic founders of both early and late market firm categories 
reported that, due to their academic background, their instinctive tendency would have been to 
be cautious and risk-averse. Therefore, by engaging with and being open to industrial partners 
and surrogate entrepreneurs,  a positive imprint was embedded which changed founders mind-
set and behaviours, ultimately contributing to an earlier market entry. 
A final important source of imprinting identified by early entrant USOs during pre-
entry was the parent university. Affiliation to their parent university was perceived by early 
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entrants as adding status and credibility, where university affiliation signalled to market parties 
that the USO marketed state-of-the-art reliable and innovative offerings, as “everyone expects 
that anyone associated with [this university] will always come up with amazing and new 
innovative ideas” (USO Founder, Case EAR1). The added credibility was reported to facilitate 
early market entry because it provided a stamp on the USO, which signalled to market parties 
that the USO was reliable. Furthermore, it gave early entrant USO founders more confidence 
to speak to key industry players and potential customers. “By being affiliated with the 
university, we eliminated the reputational barrier the spin-off might have encountered 
otherwise… You know, I would call people saying “Good morning, I am calling from [name of 
USO] from [name of university]”, and their reaction would be “Oh! Help! This must be 
serious!” (USO Founder, Case EAR2). The affiliation was identified as being critical during 
early entrant USOs’ pre-entry phase and accelerated their progression to market, a pattern that 
did not emerge among late entrant USOs. 
Late entrant USOs identified three sources of imprinting during pre-entry: industrial 
partners, the university and the wider academic environment; and the university ecosystem as 
a whole. Many late entrants highlighted challenges and obstacles during pre-entry which 
caused the founders to feel discouraged and to perceive higher risks than reported by early 
entrants, which appeared to slow their market entry. For example, similar to early entrants, the 
majority of late entrant USOs engaged with industrial partners during pre-entry. However, 
unlike early entrants, late entrant USOs identified their industrial partners as unhelpful, 
disinterested and uncommitted to the venture. For example, Case LAT10 and Case LAT5 
reported that their industrial partners had made promises, such as the provision of financial 
support, market access and commissions that were not subsequently kept, creating further 
challenges for the USOs and increasing their time-to-market. 
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[The industrial partner] was meant to order some products from us straight away [upon 
foundation]. But we received the order with a 10-month delay. During those 10 months, the 
person that we were hoping to hire, a highly specialised guy, was hired by another company. 
So we weren’t able to hire anybody, and this created a loss of momentum for the spin-off. 
Effectively, we were only able to enter the market with this product after 10 months (USO 
Founder, Case LAT10). Such a pattern emphasises the need for synergy and fit among the 
involved parties for imprinting to happen, and not their mere involvement. Late entrants’ 
perceptions of and experiences with ecosystem entities, where external entities behaved in a 
disinterested and uncommitted manner, resulted in the USOs and external parties not being 
able to fruitfully cooperate and to realise the added value of combining their tangible and 
intangible assets. The interviews revealed that late entrants’ negative experiences and lack of 
synergy with  ecosystem entities during each phases cumulatively increased their caution, risk 
aversion and closure to future imprinting. 
       Similar to early entrants, late entrants also identified the university and the wider academic 
environment as a source of imprinting during pre-entry, but this was not positive. Late entrants 
perceived their affiliation as having slowed down their progress, leading them to hide their 
nature as USOs from market parties. Indeed, late entrants reported that market parties 
erroneously viewed USOs’ university affiliation as signalling the involvement of a public 
institution, which in the Italian context is notoriously complex and bureaucratic. This was 
suggested to drive many potential clients and investors away from late entrant USOs, thus 
slowing down market entry. Case LAT3 identified, “Spin-offs of any university had huge 
warning signs associated with them, because they viewed you [the USO] as working for a 
public institution… so firms wanted to have nothing to do with you. […]”. While the university 
affiliation also potentially presented a risk for early entrants, the findings revealed that the 
positive synergistic involvement of surrogate entrepreneurs and industrial partners from the 
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outset enabled founders to learn how to make the distinction between the firm and the 
university very clear and, in some instances, to use it to their benefit when reaching out to 
market parties. As a result, the founders were able to benefit from the university’s scientific 
credibility, while reducing its market-related risks. 
A final source of imprinting among late entrant USOs was the university ecosystem as 
a whole. This was frequently emphasised by late entrant founders as providing inadequate or 
limited support. Incubators and the funding infrastructure for early stage companies were 
emphasised as being a source of frustrations and delays. Several founders labelled the incubator 
as being ‘useless’ and ‘expensive’, and as employing a one-size-fits-all approach to support. 
According to the founders, such an approach did not complement their existing skill-sets, nor 
did it address their weaknesses. 
The support the incubator provided... it was completely useless and a waste of time. The vast 
majority of the firms that were incubated there developed software, or applications. We were 
making actual things, so we needed a different type of support that they couldn’t provide. 
Manufacturing support, logistical support, storage space… And on top of that, it was 
outrageously expensive. (USO Founder, Case LAT6).  
In sum, the pre-entry stage emerged as being the most influential sensitive period in 
relation to USOs’ market entry timing. Early entrant USOs continuted to engage with 
ecosystem players extensively and benefited substantially from these interactions. However, it 
was evident that a condition of positive imprinting was that the interactions and relationships 
were of a collaborative and synergistic nature, whereby all parties involved manifested 
commitment and openness to the engagement. Conversely, late entrant USOs also engaged 
with ecosystem entities during pre-entry, despite their negative experiences in the earlier 
phases. However, they were unable to establish synergistic collaborations and, therefore, faced 
several obstacles which contributed to a delayed market entry. 
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 V Discussion  
Over the last decade, the important role USOs play in transferring academic research to 
markets, generating university income, regional innovation and employment has been 
acknowledged [13] [25]. Prior research has sought to explain the process of USO development, 
focusing on issues such as the characteristics of the founders and founding team [10] [16] and 
how different support mechanisms such as TTOs and incubators can contribute to USO 
development [25] [26] [6]. However, Good et al. [4] argue that prior research takes an atomistic 
view of technology transfer support and identifies the need to look at the holistic impact of the 
university ecosystem. This is particularly important for high technology USOs, who often 
operate within short industry life cycles, requiring early market entry to increase their chances 
of success [71]. We build on prior USO research and identify how imprinting theory can 
generate new insights. We do this by taking a micro level perspective of the process of USO 
formation to explore the role of university ecosystem engagement in influencing the timing of 
a USO’s first market entry. From the findings, we identify three sensitive periods, namely 
the research phase, idea conception, and pre-market entry, which constitute important phases 
during USOs’ pre-foundation development. During each phase, university ecosystem 
imprinters were identified to play a positive or negative role in shaping USO founders’ strategic 
decision making, risk perceptions and market readiness (see figure 1).  
 The findings provide new insights on the role played by individual ecosystem entities 
as important imprinters throughout USO formation. For example, extending prior research [33] 
[26], the findings identify the key imprinting role TTOs, incubators, surrogate entrepreneurs 
and industrial partners had for all USOs (either postive or negative) at different stages (see 
figure 1) for early and late market entrants. Whilst these actors have been found to play a vital 
role in USO development in prior literature [6] [14] [7], they have not been linked to market 
Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions in Engineering Management 
27 
 
entry timing. TTOs, for example, were identified by early entrants as having helped ingrain the 
need for market research [54] from as early as the research phase, helped with skills 
development and connected them with other important entities. Incubators were also perceived 
as important imprinters by early entrants, providing strategic support in translating research 
outputs into attractive market offerings during pre-entry. Surrogate entrepreneurs and industrial 
partners were identified as instrumental in instilling entrepreneurial proclivity within early 
entrant founders. Ultimately, these interactions influenced founders’ future decisions and 
actions [21] [53] by not only developing their skills but through altering their cognitive frames, 
shifting from a largely conservative and survival-focused mind-set, to a growth-driven 
orientation. These positive imprinting experiences, however, were not identified among late 
entrant USOs, who engaged with ecosystem entities to a lesser extent.  Despite being in the 
same university environment as early entrants, late entrants emphasised the university 
environment, the TTO, the incubator, surrogate entrepreneurs, and industrial partners as 
negatively influencng their USO development.  This was due to negative comments which 
generated discouragement, heightened uncertainty and caution which had a long lasting impact, 
leading to delays in their USO development.  
While the the individual imprinting role of each entity emerged as important, extending 
prior research on the value of certain support mechanisms and entities [53] [4], what appeared 
to be even more critical was their holistic imprinting effect on USO development [4]. The 
ecosystem interactions maintained by early entrant USOs throughout the difference stages of 
formation holistically benefited them by positively imprinting entrepreneurial behaviours and 
encouraging the academic founders, helping to alleviate resource challenges and facilitating 
the acquisition of market knowledge. The opposite pattern emerged among late entrant USOs, 
whose holistic engagment with the ecosystem perpetuated founders’ risk-aversion and 
uncertainty about the entrepreneurial opportunity. In particular, the findings indicated that 
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founders’ perceptions, experiences and interactions with the university ecosystem as a whole, 
as opposed to the support provided per se, emerged as influential. Indeed, the support provided 
by the university ecosystem appeared to remain consistent for all USOs within the same 
institution; yet, founders of each USO category reported very different imprinting experiences 
with the same types of actors. These findings are in line with Tilcsik’s [56] arguments and 
would help explain the mixed findings reported by prior research [6] [4] [7]. Further, they 
highlight the need to monitor interactions with and perceptions of the university ecosystem to 
ensure synergistic and positive experiences from as early as the research phase. 
Critical to the divergence in ecosystem perceptions was late entrants’ tendency to be 
less receptive and open to university ecosystem interactions and therefore imprinting, 
compared to early entrant USOs. Indeed, positive experiences in the research phase impacted 
USOs’ openness to receiving support at later phases of development, and the extent to which 
founders actively or passively pursued USO development [54].  This is consistent with existing 
arguments that positive imprinting is an active, rather than passive process of transmission 
between two or more committed parties [21] [24]. Hahn et al. [53] stress that individuals need 
to be receptive and open for social interactions to “stamp” an influence over future actions and 
trigger cognitive changes. In particular, scientists need to possess the right mind-set to abandon 
their academic “career imprint” and create an organisational culture that is conducive to 
entrepreneurship [72]. Our findings illustrate how this can be achieved through positive 
imprinting. This extends research by Hahn et al. [53], who highlight the importance of having 
a reference point to benchmark ‘appropriate behaviour’. For example, if the academic founders 
use their academic peers as the key reference point for appropriate behaviour, as was the case 
for late entrants, they are likely to reinforce their shared academic norms and cognition and 
are, therefore, unlikely to embrace an entrepreneurial and risk-taking mind-set. Conversely, if 
the academic founders use their market peers as a new reference point for appropriate 
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behaviour, as was the case in early entrant USOs, they are more likely to accept and 
successfully emulate entrepreneurial behaviour. Consequently, our findings provide important 
insights into how academic founders can overcome their ‘career imprint’ [53] and become 
receptive to entrepreneurial imprinting on behalf of university ecosystem stakeholders.  
Overall, the findings extend prior research on USO support mechanisms [14] [52] and 
identify that through receptivity and openness to ecosystem imprinting, USOs learn to manage 
the risks and uncertainty associated with an early market entry in a dynamic technological 
market. In particular, we provide empirical evidence identifying that USOs will achieve market 
readiness earlier if they have positive early interactions with university ecosystem entities 
which cumulatively will lead them to be open to future ecosystem engagement and imprints 
[43]. It is widely recognised that subsconscious memory [24] and organisational inertia can 
cause rigidities that can be difficult to change [73]. Therefore, it is important that USO founders 
are exposed to a supportive university environment and positive ecosystem interactions from 
their research phase; but also accept these new partners as appropriate reference points for new 
behavioural development. Collectively, these factors will enhance the effectiveness of USO 
development and earliness to market. These findings are important as, first, they contribute to 
explaining why some academic founders embrace the norms of entrepreneurship while others 
continue to prioritise their scientific achievements [1] [28] [25]. Second, they highlight that the 
mind-set of academic founders during formation is as important as the quality of support 
provided by the ecosystem. 
 
VII Contributions and Conclusions  
Our findings provide new insights into how imprints from university ecosystems can 
play a role in influencing the timing of USO market entry. Overall, our research makes several 
contributions to theory development. First, we extend literature on USO market entry timing 
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by identifying its determinants through the novel lense of imprinting theory. To date, there is a 
lack of research on the micro level influences of USO market entry timing [43] [18] [8]; 
therefore, our research helps to extend knowledge on how positive imprinting from university 
ecosystem actors and a supportive university environment can lead to earlier market entry. 
Additionally, we provide new insights into the application of imprinting theory in a USO 
context by identifying the role that different university ecosystem actors play at key ‘sensitive 
periods’ in helping USO founders to manage risk and uncertainty throughout formation, 
resulting in greater market readiness at foundation and earlier market entry.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on university ecosystems by identifying the 
enduring impact that the university environment and individual ecosystem actors (such as the 
TTO, incubator, surrogate entrepreneurs and industry) can have on USO founders’ decision 
making, motivation and market readiness.  Through this, we provide new insights into the 
market entry timing implications of university ecosystem support. Understanding the 
determinants of market entry timing is critical in the context of high-technology industries 
which have increasingly short windows of opportunity [43] and life cycles [71]. Further, in line 
with Ellis et al. [45, p. 66], who suggests that “founders imprint the culture, knowledge, and 
strategies to which they are initially exposed onto their organizations”, we draw attention to 
the influence positive and negative imprints university ecosystem actors can have on USO 
founders from as early as the research phase. Through this, we contribute to explaining the 
existing conflicting findings on the firm-level outcomes of different university support 
mechanisms [7] [6] by illustrating that USO founders may be less receptive or ‘open’ to 
ecosystem support due to prior experiences which consequently influence future imprinting. 
We illustrate that early entrants’ greater openness to engagement with university ecosystem 
actors due to positive experiences at the research phase compared to late entrants, contributed 
to the early entrants’ positive imprinting and, subsequently, earlier market entry.  
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Third, the study contributes to academic entrepreneurship literature and, in particular, 
it extends knowledge on the importance of enhancing their market and industry skill 
development to improve USO firm-level outcomes [8] [14]. The findings support and extend 
existing research by suggesting that the intervention of industry-experienced individuals, such 
as industrial partners or surrogate entrepreneurs, are advantaged in the creation of favourable 
firm-level outcomes [38], particularly early market entry. These time advantages stem from the 
learning curve effects associated with the external partners’ prior experience which, when 
combined with technological knowledge, shorten time-to-market [43]. A condition for the 
achievement of these advantages was the ability and willingness of academics to abandon their 
‘career imprint’ by shifting their benchmark of appropriate behaviour to these market parties 
[53]. We also build on prior research contending that academic founders often do not have 
access to the right types of networks for technology commercialisation [2]. Our research 
illustrates that positive engagement with university ecosystem entities at different phases of 
USO formation can help USOs to overcome many challenges related to knowledge and 
resource scarcity. 
Finally, this research concurs with Good et al. [4] and extends knowledge on the 
importance of taking a holistic university ecosystem approach to understand how to enhance 
USO development. Whilst understanding the role of individual ecosystem stakeholders as 
imprinting sources is important [53] [4], what emerged as more important is their holistic 
imprinting effect during pre-foundation [4]. Our findings provide new insights into the need to 
monitor USO interactions with the university ecosystem as a whole, and to ensure these 
interactions are holistically positive. This, ultimately, should help early entrant USOs to 
cumulatively develop market knowledge and entrepreneurial skills, capabilities and resources 
that contribute to the development of clearer paths to market, greater market readiness at 
foundation, and more confidence to enter the market early. 
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VIII Limitations and areas for future research. 
Despite the important insights gained through the novel application of imprinting to 
explore USOs ecosystem engagement and market entry timing, this research has several 
limitations. First, we adopted a qualitative methodology to gain rich insights into the complex 
interactions and imprinting effects of the university environment and ecosystem stakeholders 
on USOs. Whilst imprinting theory recognises the role of individual characteristics such as 
prior knowledge, background, relationships and career experiences [22], it was out of the scope 
of our study to explore all these factors in depth. While the academic founders all had similar 
characteristics in terms of academic background and career experiences (see table 2), future 
research should adopt a quantitative approach to test relationships between individual, 
environmental and ecosystem sources of imprinting during USO formation and their influence 
on strategic outcomes such as speed. This may help identify stronger USO founding teams who 
possess a multitude of experiences, skills and capabilities. Second, whilst this research 
identified changes to USO founders’ cognitive framing and mental models as a result of 
positive imprinting experiences, future research could explore how different types of imprinters 
lead to different types of capability development and learning which influence USO 
development. Third, our research explored USO development from the research phase to 
market entry, which was useful to identify the influence of pre-market entry support; however, 
future research should take a longitudinal approach to identify how imprinting experiences 
influence post market entry growth and survival. Fourth, the study focuses on an individual 
country context, Italy. While Italy shares many similarities with other European countries, 
particularly Continental European countries such as Spain, future research should increase the 
external validity of the findings by conducting comparative analyses involving other European 
country contexts. Finally, first market entry timing bears important implications for firms’ 
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achievement of first mover advantages, particularly in high-technology industries. While it was 
beyond the scope of this study to capture the competitive dynamics of USOs’ target markets, 
future research should examine how market entry timing influences USOs’ competitive 
positioning and achievement of first mover advantages. 
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Category Interview Respondent University Position 
TTOs TTO 1 University 1 Head of TTO 
 TTO 2 University 2 Head of TTO 
Incubators Incubator 1 University 1 General Director of Incubator 
 Incubator 2 University 2 CTO of Incubator 
Trade 
Agencies 
Market Agency 1 - National Both External Relations Manager 
 Market Agency 2 - International Both Business Developer - Italy 
 Market Agency 3 - International Both 
Head of Sponsorships and 
Partnerships 
 Market Agency 4 - 
International; based in Italy. 
Both 
Deputy Consul General and 
Deputy Director of Trade & 
Investment 
Providers of 
Finance 
Business Angel 
Both Private Investor 
Assistant to Business Angel 
 Industrial Partner 1 Both Director of Industrial Partner 1 
 Industrial Partner 2 Both Director of Industrial Partner 2 
Table 1 – Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Respondents 
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Table 2 – USO Interview Respondents 
 
 
USO Uni. Field Technology Interview Participant 
Academic Founder(s) 
Background 
Found.Year Market Entry 
EAR1 
Uni1 
Electronics and 
ICT 
Diagnostic device for industrial processes. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2014 < 6 months 
EAR2 
Uni1 Chemistry Custom-made solutions for surface coatings. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2012 < 6 months 
EAR3 
Uni1 Energy Technology for the remote supply of energy. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2009 < 6 months 
EAR4 
Uni1 Mechanics Robots for Industrial automation in the pharmaceutical industry. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2014 < 6 months 
EAR5 
Uni1 Energy Consulting services in the field of renewable energy and power electronics. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2006 < 6 months 
EAR6 Uni1 Mathematics Custom-made solutions and software in a wide range of industries. CEO/Co-founder Purely academic background; team of senior academics. 2010 < 6 months 
EAR7 
Uni1 
Aerospace 
engineering 
Algorithm for the millimetric measurement and monitoring of geophysical 
phenomena 
CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and one PhD student. 
2000 < 6 months 
EAR8 Uni1 Electronics Technology for X-ray and Gamma-ray applications. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and recent PhD graduates. 2009 < 6 months 
EAR9 
Uni2 Energy Storage systems for renewable energy. CTO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2005 < 6 months 
EAR10 Uni2 Electronics Innovative software for the resolution of modelling problems. President/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; one senior academic and two recent PhD graduates. 2007 < 6 months 
EAR11 Uni2 ICT Technology aimed at efficient energy consumption. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of recent PhD graduates. 2011 < 6 months 
LAT1 
Uni1 
Nuclear 
engineering 
Algorithm and model development for the performance of industrial 
systems. 
CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 2012 > 6 months 
LAT2 
Uni1 Mechanics 
Technology for the conversion of traditional vehicles into hybrid or electric 
vehicles. 
Founding member (no 
ownership) 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics. 
2012 > 6 months 
LAT3 
Uni1 Geomatics Custom-made solutions using Geomatic technologies. 
1.CEO/Co-founder ;2.Co-
founder /Researcher. 
Purely academic background; team of recent PhD graduates/post-doctoral staff. 
2012 > 6 months 
LAT4 
Uni1 Mechanics Robots for Industrial automation and bin picking. CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and PhD students/post-
doctoral staff. 
2006 > 6 months 
LAT5 
Uni1 
Electronics and 
ICT 
Technology for the characterisation of MEMS sensors. 
1.President/Co-founder;2. 
CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics and recent PhD graduates. 
2014 > 6 months 
LAT6 
Uni1 
Biomedical 
engineering 
Diagnostic device for respiratory pathologies. 
CEO/Co-founder/R&D 
Director 
Purely academic background; team of recent PhD graduates. 
2010 > 6 months 
LAT7 
Uni1 Electronics Innovative e-Bike motor. 
Co-founder/Marketing 
Manager 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics, PhD students and recent 
PhD graduates. 
2013 > 6 months 
LAT8 Uni1 Energy Custom-made solutions in the field of energy efficiency. Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics. 2013 > 6 months 
LAT9 
Uni2 
Fire 
engineering 
Custom-made numerical solutions in the fields of fire engineering and 
thermal science. 
CEO/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics. 
2007 > 6 months 
LAT10 
Uni2 
Aerospace 
engineering 
Custom-made technologies for aerial surveillance. President/Co-founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics. 
2005 > 6 months 
LAT11 
Uni2 Electronics Intelligent LED lighting bulbs. 
1.CEO/Co-founder; 
2.Scientific Advisor/Co-
founder 
Purely academic background; team of senior academics. 
2013 > 6 months 
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Early Entrant USOs                                                                                                                                                                                                   Research Phasen                                                                                                                                                                    Late Entrant USOs 
First Order Codes Second Order 
Codes 
Second Order 
Codes 
First Order Codes 
The lack of career opportunities within the academic environment motivated founders to create a USO as an alternative career path 
(positive). 
The knowledge-driven orientation of the academic environment contributed to academics adopting a research-driven attitude to 
work, generating knowledge for knowledge accumulation instead of its commercialisation (negative). 
The academic and commercial environments largely viewed as separate worlds (negative); academics gain limited exposure to 
business experience and, therefore, develop limited business-related skills (negative).  
Pressure to deliver state-of-the-art research outputs caused academics to focus on being innovative and world-leading(positive). 
Academic 
Environment 
Academic 
Environment 
The lack of career opportunities within the academic environment motivated founders to create a USO as an 
alternative career path (positive). 
The knowledge-driven orientation of the academic environment contributed to academics adopting a research-
driven attitude to work, generating knowledge for knowledge accumulation instead of its commercialisation 
(negative). 
The academic and commercial environments largely viewed as separate worlds (negative); academics gain 
limited exposure to business experience and, therefore, develop limited business-related skills (negative).  
Academics’ technology transfer experience and market engagement caused a shift in mind-set from purely research-driven to 
market-driven (positive). 
Market-driven research generated outputs that addressed market gaps and led to the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities 
(positive).  
Constant engagement with market parties through TT increased academics’ confidence in entrepreneurial opportunities(positive). 
Technology 
Transfer 
Experience 
 
Technology 
Transfer 
Experience 
 
Dominance of research-driven outputs resulted in technologies being transferred with limited market demand 
(negative); TT partners often regarded technologies as premature and/or underdeveloped for the market 
(negative). 
TT engagement generated initial ideas to commercialise the research (positive). 
University department supported and encouraged academics to engage in science commercialisation by creating a favourable 
environment (positive). 
University 
Department 
 
University 
Department 
 
Pressure on behalf of the department for academics to behave as ‘pure academics’ resulted in academics 
manifesting limited interest in the commercial environment and aversion to research commercialisation. This 
was regarded as having a long-lasting influence on their behaviour throughout formation (negative). 
Early Entrant USOs                                                                                                                                                                                     Business Idea Conception                                                                                                                                                   Late Entrant USOs 
First Order Codes: Second Order 
Codes: 
Second Order 
Codes: 
First Order Codes: 
Potential clients approached the research group requesting their technology, thus signalling a market gap (positive). 
Potential clients gave academics encouragement and confidence in the attractiveness of the opportunity (positive). 
Potential clients transferred market-specific knowledge to the research group and helped academics frame the opportunity 
(positive). 
Potential clients supported academics in recognising the market value in their proposition (positive). 
Clients/Potent
ial Clients 
 
Business plan 
competitions 
 
Positive results in regional, national and/or international business plan competitions resulted in 
encouragement and greater confidence on behalf of academics in their business opportunity (positive). 
Feedback received from business plan competitions helped academics identify the valuable aspects in their 
proposed market offering (positive). 
 
The incubator helped give academic founders more direction and provided a clear sequence of steps to follow to reach foundation 
and market entry (positive). 
The TTO required all founding teams to develop a business plan and forecast sales figures as a bureaucratic requirement of the 
university to approve USOs. This provided greater clarity to founders and inspired their growth ambitions (positive). 
Incubator and TTO use helped founders develop business skills and better business planning thanks to the involvement of TT 
experts, market mentors and advisors (positive). 
Positive feedback on behalf of the TTO and incubator resulted in academic founders feeling more encouraged and confident 
about the opportunity (positive). 
Support received from the TTO and the incubator helped founders frame the opportunity in the light of existing market offerings 
and identify the value-added aspects of their technology (positive) 
Incubator and 
TTO 
 
Technology 
Transfer 
Experience 
 
Technology transfer parties signalled that demand was low and that the market was not ready for the 
technology yet, resulting in more cautious behaviour (negative). 
 
Engagement with market parties during technology transfer enabled academic founders to gain market-
specific knowledge and understand the marketplace better (positive). 
 
Technology transfer engagement enabled founders to identify a market gap, resulting in their opportunity 
identification (positive). 
Industrial partner helped founders identify the opportunity by scanning the market (positive). 
Involvement of industrial partner supported founders in framing the business opportunity more clearly and shaping their offering 
according to the opportunity (positive). 
The business experience of the industrial partner, combined with founders technological know-how, generated synergies 
(positive) and contributed to the founding team being more proactive and confident (positive). 
Industrial 
Partner 
 
Industrial 
partner 
 
Negative feedback and disinterest on behalf of industrial partners involved the founding team resulted in 
discouragement and perceptions of low market demand/unattractiveness of opportunity (negative). 
 
Involvement of a surrogate entrepreneur in the founding team resulted in the transfer of commercial skills and market awareness 
(positive). 
Merging of technical and business skills created founding teams with technical excellence that had the ability to effectively sell 
market solutions  (positive). 
Surrogate entrepreneurs guided academic founders toward successful opportunity exploitation by providing them with clear 
direction and teaching them ‘appropriate entrepreneurial behaviour’ (positive). 
Surrogate 
Entrepreneur 
 
TTO 
 
By forcing founders to develop a business plan, the TTO provided greater clarity to USO founders about the 
opportunity (positive); however, founders perceived forecasting sales figures as an experience that 
pressurised them to overestimate growth outcomes, increasing their caution and risk-aversion (negative). 
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The involvement of surrogate entrepreneurs helped founders develop a USO with a business model that would be appropriate to 
its market opportunity (positive). 
  University 
 
The university was perceived to be neutral or disinterested toward the creation of USOs and science 
commercialisation, thus providing little encouragement to founders (negative). 
Early Entrant USOs                                                                                                                                                                                                      Pre-Entry                                                                                                                                                                             Late Entrant USOs 
First Order Codes Second Order 
Codes 
Second Order 
Codes 
First Order Codes 
Potential clients taught academic founders how to plan for opportunity pursuit and effectively present their offering as a market 
parties (positive). 
The identification and involvement of clients during pre-foundation perpetuated confidence in the opportunity and encouraged 
founders to persevere through formation (positive). 
Potential clients highlighted the need to maintain a clear separation between the USO, a private profit-making firm, and the parent 
university, a public knowledge-driven institution, when approaching market parties (positive). 
Clients/potent
ial clients 
Academic 
environment 
An unsupportive environment perpetuated founders tendency to behave extremely cautiously when 
approaching potential clients (negative).  
Limited exposure to market parties resulted in founders developing limited business skills and largely 
focusing on firm survival and sustainability, rather than growth (negative). 
The incubator helped founders identify the required steps and approach the appropriate people to ensure a clear path to market, 
giving founders greater direction and purpose (positive). 
The incubator placed emphasis on USO growth, as opposed to mere survival, leading founders to also embrace this focus 
(positive). 
Incubator 
 
Industrial 
partners 
 
The involvement of industrial partners helped founders gain greater structure and direction toward market 
entry (positive). 
Engagement with industrial partners often did not generate positive, synergistic results, as the interests of 
USO and industrial partner were not aligned and the two parties, therefore, did not work well together 
(negative). 
Industrial partners discouraged and undermined USOs, and often caused delays due to the industrial partners 
not prioritising their relationship with the USOs who, in turn, heavily relied on them  for support and 
guidance (negative). 
Industrial partner involvement was a significant source of encouragement and confidence (positive), and also alleviated founders’ 
risk-perceptions by acting as USO’s first client and providing financial support (positive). 
The industrial partner was provided guidance and teaching to USO founders, by transferring business skills, commercial 
awareness and providing continuous mentoring support (positive). 
Industrial partner involvement, largely motivated by prospects of financial gain, drove founders to proactively search for ways to 
take the offering to market and maximise firm growth (positive). 
The industrial partner acted as a critic of the ‘academic way of doing things’, emphasising the limitations  and non-commercial 
ways of the academic environment, and led founders to adopt a more market-driven approach (positive). 
e involvement of an industrial partner gave USOs credibility in the eyes of market parties and provided access to the partner’s 
market channels and contacts, accelerating entry (positive). 
Industrial 
Partner 
 
Incubator The incubator regarded as inadequate, expensive and useless in its support to USOs (negative). 
The incubator was highlighted as employing a one-size-fits-all approach to USO support, and was largely 
regarded as inadequate by USOs that did not fit its mould (negative). 
The surrogate entrepreneur emphasised the need to separate the USO from parent university to increase its credibility as a private 
company (positive), and their involvement gave USO founders a greater market-driven orientation (positive). 
The surrogate entrepreneur combined technical knowledge with market knowledge, helping founders rapidly position and take 
their offering to the market (positive). 
The surrogate entrepreneur gave founders a more structured approach and clear direction, as well as placing more emphasis on 
firm growth than mere survival (positive). 
The involvement of surrogate entrepreneurs provided USO founders with access to pools of commercial knowledge and market 
contacts, such as investors (positive). 
Surrogate 
Entrepreneur 
 
University 
 
The university provided USOs with added credibility from a technological and innovation perspective, due to 
the scientific reputation of the university (positive). 
The university damaged the credibility of the USO in the eyes of market parties, due to the firm’s association 
with a public institution, which are notoriously complex and bureaucratic in Italy. This was regarded as an 
additional obstacle by founders and caused delays to market entry (negative). 
The USO’s association with its parent university provided the firm with added credibility in the eyes of market parties, due to the 
high esteem of the parent university and its scientific reputation (positive); 
Continuous collaboration with the parent university and, particularly, the research group and its lab, provided technical support 
during the critical final stages of technology launch onto the market (positive). 
A supportive university environment provided founders with further confidence and reassurance in the pursuit of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity, and even encouraged the involvement of industrial partners (positive). 
University 
 
Holistic 
ecosystem 
 
The holistic ecosystem caused delays and challenges through lengthy and complex bureaucracy, unfulfilled 
agreements (such as delayed funding provisions, product orders placed with substantial delays, etc), which 
caused substantial discouragement and further caution on behalf of USO founders (negative). 
 
Table 3 – Case Data Summary 
